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the statute, as a whole, must be stated in positive language to assure a standard
interpreptation by the courts.
The following model statute is submitted as effecting the ideas found in the
above paragraph:
"Manslaughter:
I. Voluntary -
IL Involuntary - Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional,
unlawful killing of a human being. It is of two kinds:
(1) In the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate, any common
law or statutory misdemeanor which endangers human life
and safety. The homicide must be the proximate result
of the commission of, or attempt to commit, the misde-
meanor.
(2) In the commission of any lawful act in a criminally negli-
gent manner."
It will be noted that the ultimate test for conviction under subsection (1) and sub-
section (2) is the same, although stated in a different manner. Liability is based
upon the amount of danger in the act under sub-section (1), while negligence is
the basis of liability in sub-section (2). Negligence, however, is deterrmned by
the foreseeability of danger. Thus a conviction of involuntary manslaughter may
only be obtained by showing a dangerous act. Any conviction that could be ob-
tained under sub-section (1) could also be obtained under sub-section (2). It
follows that it might be well to eliminate the misdemeanor manslaughter and to
base the conviction of involuntary manslaughter solely upon negligence.
ROBERT F STEPHENS
MISDEMEANOR MANSLAUGHTER UNDER STATE STATUTES*
Today, in the absence of statute, it is involuntary manslaughter where one
unintentionally kills another in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting
to a felony.' This is usually referred to as the misdemeanor, manslaughter doctrine.
Under this rule the killing is done without any design, intention or purpose of
killing, but in the commission of some unlawful nonfelomous act.
This rule is the basis for the "misdemeanor manslaughter" statutes which
have been adopted by twenty-five states. Before examining these statutes, it is
essential that the common law be closely observed. The mental state which
characterizes the crime of involuntary manslaughter is the absence of intention
to cause death. In determining whether a culpable homicide was committed by
a person while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor, it is not necessary
to conclude that he shall have intended to violate the law, although he must have
had an intent to commit the act. The unlawful act, however, must be dangerous
in itself or in marked disregard of the safety of others. A mere thoughtless
omission or slight deviation from the norm of reasonable conduct will not suffice.
The state of mind of the person while committing the act is not controlling. Fur-
* This is a companion note to the one by Mr. Stephens on page .........
'Wilner, Unintentional Homicide in the Commission of an Unlawful Act, 87
PA. L. BEv. 811 (1939).2 See, Westrup v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 95, 93 S.W 646 (1906).
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thermore, it is of no importance whether the act was unlawful in its inception or
became unlawful after the act was begun. The infraction must be such as would
be.reasonably anticipated by an ordinary prudent man as likely to result in the
homicide. There must be such legal relation between the commission of the
unlawful act and the killing that it logically follows that the homicide occurred
as a part of the perpetration of, or attempt to commit, the unlawful act. The death
must result from the unlawful act of the accused and not from the intervemng
act or negligence of a third person, or to an independent intervemng cause in
which the accused did not participate and which he could not foresee. Thus, the
death must have been the natural and probable consequence of the unlawful act,
and the act the proximate cause of death.'
Twenty-two states have no statutory provision for misdemeanor manslaughter.
In Texas there is no such crime as "involuntary manslaughter," but the existing
statute has substituted what is termed "negligent -homicide."4 Since all of the
aforementioned twenty-two states have manslaughter statutes they must of ne-
cessity rely upon the common law in those cases where the accused kills a person
while in the perpetration of a misdemeanor. The remaimng twenty-five states
have adopted statutes which either closely resemble the common law or have re-
vised it to some extent. In examimng these statutes, it must be remembered that
they were created to furmsh the courts with an accurate guide, either by making
the common law more definite or by improving upon it by making certain re-
visions. or additions. It is wise to keep in mind the fact that almost half of the
states have thought it unnecessary to codify the common law. This fact alone
indicates that the legislative task of creating a misdemeanor manslaughter statute
of any real value over the common law is a difficult one.
Six state? have statutes which are readily distinguishable from the others in
that they they require the killing to occur while the accused is committing some
"unlawful act" The Tennessee Statute is a good example. It states:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without
malice, either express or implied, which may be either voluntary upon
a sudden heat, or involuntary, but in the commission of some un-
lawful act."
Such a statute resembles the common law except for the expansion of that
rule, insofar as the collateral act is concerned, from a mere misdemeanor to any
unlawful act. Therefore a person who kills while committing a felony could be
found guilty of manslaughter, thus encroaching upon the felony murder doctrine,
unless there were a parallel felony murder statute. The wording of the statute
brings the court face to face with the problem of determimng whether the legisla-
ture intended to expand the common law or whether it merely intended to codify
Note, 63 L. R. A. 379; 40 C. J. S. 918-921.
'Texas has no such crime as involuntary manslaughter but the statute [Tex.
Stat. Pen. Code, art. 1230 et seq. (Vernon, 1936)] has substituted what is termed
"negligent homicide," which consists in the doing of an act, lawful or unlawful,
in a careless or negligent manner, when there is apparent danger of causing the
death of the person killed or some other, but with no apparent intention to kill.
The homicide must be the consequence of the act done or attempted to be done.
'4 ARK. STAT. ANN. sec. 41-2209 (1947); 4 IND. STAT. ANN. sec. 10-3405
(Bums, 1942); 2 NEB. REV. STAT.. sec. 28-403 (1943); 3 ORE. Coz". LAws ANiN.
sec. 23-406 (1940); 7 TENN. CODE ANN. sec. 10774 (Williams, 1934); 1 Wyo.
Comp. STAT. ANN. see. 9-205 (1945). Note that all except the Oregon Statute
require the killing to be done either "without malice" or without "intent."
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it and did so rather inefficiently. It is difficult to see how such a piece of legisla-
tion can achieve its purpose of putting at the court's disposal a more effective
instrument than that afforded by the common law. In this case, the instrument
needs sharpening before it will be of value to the court in helping to untangle
the many problems created by human inability to conform to the desired stand-
ards of behavior. With such an instrument to rely upon, the court may scratch
the surface but fail to pierce the heart of the legal problem. Since such high
stakes as a man s freedom may hinge upon a correct interpretation of a few ill-
chosen words, ambiguity should be reduced to a inimmum.
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, and Nevada have statutes' similar to the above
group, but have additional provisions. The Georgia statute is typical of the group
under consideration. It states:
"Involuntary manslaughter shall consist in the killing of
a human being without any intention to do so, but in the commission
of an unlawful act, or a lawful act which probably might produce
such a consequence, in an unlawful manner; Provided that where such
involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of an unlawful
act which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of
a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a riotous intent,
or of a crime punishable by death or confinement in the penitentiary,
the offense shall be deemed and adjudged to be murder."
This statute excludes felonies from the unlawful acts which will satisfy the re-
quirements for manslaughter, but does not reduce the necessary collateral acts
to misdemeanors only. The provision that makes it manslaughter to kill while
committing a lawful act in an unlawful manner is an adaptation of the common
law. The resulting statute on its face apparently combines the misdemeanor man-
slaughter rule and the negligent manslaughter doctrine. The distinction, if any,
between the commission of an unlawful act and a lawful one in an unlawful man-
ner is indeed vague. It is doubtful whether there are any situations which would
fall within the "unlawful commission of a lawful act" sphere wlnch would not be
within either the misdemeanor manslaughter or the negligent manslaughter pro-
visions. Thus, the lawful act clause in the statutes under consideration is sur-
plusage and does not improve upon the unlawful act provision in those states
which have a negligent manslaughter provision in their statutes.
The Louisiana and the Idaho Statutes' are the only other ones which include
both misdemeanors and felonies, although the latter are specifically limited. The
Louisiana Statute states:
"Manslaughter is: (2) A homicide committed, without
any intent to cause death or great bodily harm (a) when the offender
is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony
not enumerated in Article 30, or any intentional misdemeanor directly
affecting the person "
It will be noted that this statute, unlike the preceding one, includes only imsde-
meanors directly affecting the person. The Idaho Statute is the same as that of
02 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, sec. 36 (1935); 6 GA. CODE ANN. see. 67 (Park,
1914); ILL. MV. STAT. c. 38, see. 363 (1947); 5 NEv. Coin. LAws ANN. see.
1,0072 (Hillyer, 1929).
4 IDAHO CODE see. 18-4006 (1948); LA. CODE CRim. LAW AND PRo. ANN.
art. 740-81 (Dart, 1943).
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Louisiana except that the excluded felonies are specifically set out in the statute.
It states:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being,
without malice. It is of two lands:
(1) Voluntary
(2) Involuntary, in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any
unlawful act, other than arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or
mayhem; or
Six states' have similar statutes of which the Arizona Statute is typical. It
states:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice. It is of two lands: voluntary involuntary in
the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in
the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in any un-
lawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection."
This statute limits the collateral act to a misdemeanor, but as stated would include
any misdemeanor, whether dangerous to life or not. Such an all-inclusive provision
will undoubtedly produce harsh results and should distinguish between mide-
meanors which directly endanger life and those that do not.
Seven states' have statutes which separate manslaughter into degrees, it being
first degree manslaughter to kill umntentionally while committing a misdemeanor.
The Wisconsin Statute is typical of this group. It states:
"The killing of a human being, without a design to effect
death, by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of any other,
while such other is engaged in the perpetration of any crime or mis-
demeanor not amounting to a felony, or in an attempt to perpetrate
any such crime or misdemeanor, in cases where such killing would be
murder at the common law, shall be deemed manslaughter in the
first degree."
In substance this statute is substantially a replica of the common law. However,
since first degree manslaughter is comparable to voluntary manslaughter in regard
to the relative penalties involved, this statute deviates from the common law
which puts misdemeanor manslaughter in the category of involuntary manslaughter,
with a lighter penalty than for voluntary manslaughter. Minnesota and New York
have statutes which distinguish between misdemeanors affecting persons or prop-
'3 Aniz. CODE ANN. see. 43-2904 (1939); CAL. PEN. CODE see. 192 (Deering,
1949); 2 Miss. CODE ANN. sec. 2221 (1942); 8 MONT. REV. CODE ANN. sec.
94-2507 (1947); 3 N. M. STAT. ANN. sec. 41-2407 (1941); 5 UTAH CODE ANN.
sec. 103-28-5 (1943).
'KANS. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 21-407 (1935); 2 MINN. STAT. secs. 619.15,
619.18 (1945); 1 N. D. REv. CODE sec. 12-2717 (1943); N. Y. PEN. CODE sec.
1050, 1052 (Thompson, 1939); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, sec. 711 (1941); 1 S. D.
CODE see. 13.2013 (1939); Wis. STAT. sec. 340.10 (1949). Note that the Kansas
Statute is worded the same as the Wisconsin Statute cited. The North Dakota
and Oklahoma Statutes state: "Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree in the
following cases: (1) when perpetrated without a design to effect death by a
person while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor. (2) The
South Dakota Statute states that "Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree in
following cases: (1) When perpetrated without a design to effect death by a per-
son while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor involving moral turpi-
tude; (2) "
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erty and those which do not, a killing arising from the commission of a misde-
meanor in the latter group being second degree manslaughter. The New York
statute states:
"Such homicide is manslaughter in the first degree, when
committed without a design to effect death: (1) By a person engaged-
in committing, or attempting to commit, a misdemeanor, effecting the
person or property, either of the person killed or of another; or "
"Such homicide is manslaughter in the second degree,
where committed'without a design to effect death: (1) By a person
committing or attempting to commit a trespass or other invasion of
a private right, either of the person killed, or of another, not amount-
ing to a crime;
This statute is broad and therein lies its weakness. The provision for manslaughter
in the first degree includes not only those acts affecting life but also property. This
section therefore does not include all misdemeanors, but it does extend liability
beyond the category of acts dangerous to life. The section on second degree man-
slaughter will -undoubtedly result in many harsh decisions. It is questionable
whether the usefulness of a provision which includes acts that are not crimes but
merely torts will outweigh the many injustices it will perpetrate. It would appear
to be adverse to a wise public policy.
A summation of the statutes reveals that few additions or alterations have
been made in the common law. The changes which have been made show no
marked departure from the common law. Since almost half of the states rely
solely upon the common law and numerous others have kept it intact in their
statutory provisions, there is little doubt that it has proven adequate in most cases.
The statutes which deviate from the common law have failed to improve upon it
in any marked degree. A provision which includes any misdemeanor or one which
includes infractions which are not crimes certainly does not improve the com-
mon law.
Using as gudes the existing statutes which have in most part failed in'their
attempt to either codify or revise the common law, it seems that in preparing a
model statute one should focus his efforts toward a satisfactory codification of the
common law rather than experiment with modifications. A good codification of the
common law is certainly of greater value to the court than no codification at all,
since a satisfactory statement of the common law, as it is actually interpretated, is
not found in the cases. The present statutes illustrate how difficult it is to codify
the common law and eliminate ambiguity and vagueness. It is suggested that the
reader bear this in mind in evaluating the following statute which is offered as a
solution to the problem discussed throughout the note.0
"Involuntary manslaughter is a hormcide committed with-
out intent to cause death or great bodily harm when the offender
(1) is engaged 'in the perpetration of any misdemeanor which is in-
herently dangerous to life and which is the proximate cause of such
homicide."
(2) [Provision for negligent manslaughter].
CHARLES R. Gaoi~rr.uY
10 Perhaps, it should be pointed out that this statute is the equivalent of the
modem statement of the common law rule in the case of involuntary manslaughter
based upon negligence but this raises problems which are beyond the scope of
this paper. It is worth noting, however, that the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the
act is not the criterion of liability-it is its inherent danger.
